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1. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental academic question in economics is why the 
multinational enterprise (MNE) exists at all. In theory, everything that 
a multinational might do can be replicated by domestic firms linked 
through a network of global contracts. In practice, of course, we 
see a full range of cross-border activity, from arm’s-length licensing 
through joint ventures to direct investment, conducted by relatively 
integrated business enterprises. In other words, there is greater 
reliance on internal organization than an abstract contract-based 
analysis might predict.
That is not to say that alliances and contractual relationships are not 
ubiquitous. To the contrary, they are exceedingly common. Indeed, 
cross-border networks have become more dense and complex over 
the past two decades as opportunities have become more global.  
Meanwhile, organizational capabilities have become not only more 
widely dispersed but also more specialized. MNE specialization 
is enabled and required by cheaper transportation and 
telecommunications that enable direct access to global sources 
of goods and services. This specialization is coupled with the 
outsourcing of many “non-core” activities.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The paper begins by briefly presenting the “eclectic” perspective on the multinational enterprise 
(MNE), then shows how the addition of the concepts of entrepreneurship, knowledge 
management, and dynamic capabilities provides a more useful set of variables for theorizing 
about the MNE. The normative conclusion advanced is that entrepreneurial management, 
knowledge awareness, and strong dynamic capabilities are necessary to sustain superior MNE 
performance in fast-moving global environments.
RESUMEN DEL ARTÍCULO   
El artículo comienza con una breve presentación de la perspectiva “ecléctica” de la 
empresa multinacional (MNE). Posteriormente se presentan conceptos adicionales como 
emprendimiento, gestión del conocimiento y capacidades dinámicas que proporcionan 
un conjunto de variables que sirver para construir teoría sobre la MNE. Las conclusiones 
avanzan que la gestión emprendedora, la constancia del conocimiento como recurso, y unas 
capacidades dinámicas fuertes son elementos necesarios para lograr resultados superiores 
sostenidos por parte de las MNE en entornos dinámicos y globalizados.KNOWlEdgE, ENTREpRENEURShIp, ANd CApABIlITIES: 
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The typical MNE today displays common asset ownership across 
national borders embedded within a dense network of alliances.   
Put differently, the dominant MNE organizational model is a blend of 
cross-border integration and contracts.
The effective management of cross-border activity both inside and 
outside the firm requires an understanding of the essence—i.e., the 
essential functions—of the multinational enterprise. The performance 
of these functions involves entrepreneurial managers, knowledge 
creation, and dynamic capabilities—all concepts that are absent 
from most economic analysis, and even some business analyses, of 
the MNE.
The paper begins by briefly reviewing the mainstream 
“eclectic paradigm” of the MNE. Important gaps in the 
paradigm are then discussed, including entrepreneurship, 
knowledge management, and capabilities. Some 
management implications of the capabilities-enhanced 
approach to the MNE are then discussed.
2. THE ECLECTIC (OLI) PARADIGM
One of the leading frameworks for explaining the activities 
of the multinational enterprise (MNE) is John Dunning’s 
“eclectic paradigm” (Dunning, 1981, 1995). It is often 
described by the acronym OLI, which stands for three groups 
of factors: ownership, location, and internalization.
“Ownership” factors are features of the firm. Successful 
firms have unique assets that give them an advantage in 
their home country, and these assets may be advantageous 
in other countries as well.
The relevant assets will most likely be intangible, such as an 
internationally known brand or the capacity to rapidly develop and 
produce new products. Such assets need to be “built”—a slow process, 
but one which results in an asset that is hard for others to imitate.
Unlike many physical assets, some intangibles can be transferred 
(replicated) and applied in new contexts, such as a different country, 
without incurring all over again the costs of creating the asset. 
The classic example is a trade secret, the use of which in two 
countries rather than one does not require duplicating the research 
and development investment that went into its creation. However, 
technology transfer is generally not costless.
“Location” factors are features of the host or home country, such as 
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the cost and skills of workers in particular locales. Differential learning 
places locations on different learning paths, producing peaks on 
today’s “rugged” global industrial landscape, which is considered 
“flat” only at risk of missing crucial differences (Levinthal, 1997). 
Advantages that flow from locating activities in specific business 
environments are increasingly important to many MNEs (see, e.g., 
Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005).  
Host country factors that might justify an initial direct investment 
cannot, however, generally provide a sustainable competitive 
advantage since they are equally accessible to other firms. 
Exceptions can occur in certain cases, such as when the enterprise 
has a privileged relationship with local government.
“Internalization” factors are those that pertain to firms operating in 
specific industries with distinct patterns of transaction costs. All 
markets involve transaction costs, which Williamson (1975) defines 
as the costs of organizing the economic system. This includes costs 
that result when one party, knowing important information that the 
other party does not, engages in ex post opportunism. The costs 
of such hazards are likely to be particularly high when transactions 
occur in thin markets between entities in different countries.
When a company goes abroad, it has the choice between investing 
directly to create a physical presence, contracting with a local firm by 
licensing its trademark and/or its technology, or some intermediate 
arrangement such as a joint venture. One criterion for the choice—
the only criterion in some theories—is the minimization of transaction 
costs. When direct investment is chosen, the transaction is said to 
have been internalized (Buckley and Casson, 1976).
However, internalization can be motivated by reasons other 
than transaction costs. It may be easier and cheaper to transfer 
technology and capabilities internally not because of high transaction 
costs and contractual risks, but because it is in fact easier to transfer 
and deploy resources internally—especially when entrepreneurship 
and learning are significant activities required to complete the task at 
hand (Teece, 1976). The transfer of capabilities and the development 
of markets, require entrepreneurial organization. In our view, the 
choice to invest abroad (rather than partner) is not driven as much 
by the need to reduce contractual hazards as by the need to align 
incentives and pursue a common (shared) vision, thereby lowering 
technology transfer costs and helping to get organizational tasks 
completed.  
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Both explanations (contract-based and capability-based) for 
internalization are important. The capabilities branch, however, has 
received relatively little attention and is not usefully squeezed into a 
transaction cost framework (Teece,1982).
3. ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND MARKET CREATION
Entrepreneurship, which can refer either to the activity of founding 
a new company or of initiating new activities within an existing 
enterprise, is typically overlooked in discussion of MNEs. In fact, 
most economic theories of the firm, multinational or otherwise, 
make the implicit assumption that all opportunities are known and 
addressed.  However, research suggests that the identification of 
opportunities, especially across borders, depends on both chance 
and skill. Addressing them is by no means straightforward either.
There are a number of subtly different definitions of entrepreneurship, 
but they generally involve two stages. First comes the identification 
of a demand that is unsatisfied. This may involve technology that 
has emerged from a speculative R&D program, or it may require 
technology that doesn’t yet exist. The second stage is taking the 
steps needed to satisfy the demand. Thus, the entrepreneur (or 
entrepreneurial manager) is, in a sense, creating the future (Kirzner, 
1985).  
The very essence of cross-border entrepreneurial activity is that it 
creates—or at least shapes—markets abroad by identifying latent 
demand, leveraging resources wherever they may be located, 
and launching new products. Performing these tasks well requires 
charismatic, cross-cultural, and adaptive leadership, deep knowledge 
of local markets, and a clear understanding of the technical, physical, 
and human constraints at hand.
Cross-border activity can occur if entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial 
managers take new knowledge and help commercialize it at home 
and abroad. They learn about internal and external resources in 
multiple geographies, arbitrage when possible, and create them 
when necessary. Because the market for knowledge about new 
opportunities isn’t well developed, entrepreneurs and managers 
must build organizational capabilities inside their firms to assist in 
the generation of this type of knowledge (Teece, 1981; Gans and 
Stern, 2010). It is by no means clear that an account of this kind 
is best squeezed into a transaction cost economics framework. The 
problems aren’t primarily contractual. Rather, they are associated dAVId J. TEECE & ABdUlRAhmAN y. Al-AAlI
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with identifying valuable capabilities developed in one market, which 
could be at home or abroad, and then deploying them globally.
In this framework, the “entrepreneur” need not be a single person.   
Instead, entrepreneurship, even in new ventures, can be thought of 
as a social process that emerges from the top management team 
and, to varying extents, from elsewhere in the organization (Foss et 
al., 2008). These processes can be replicated abroad to create (and 
capture) value.
Once an entrepreneurial firm sees the possibility of satisfying a 
latent demand or creating an entirely new market in a host country, 
the ownership, location, and internalization factors will determine 
whether the new business requires direct investment or a less 
resource-intense mode of entry. Entrepreneurship provides a more 
complete explanation for the activities of the MNE than does the 
eclectic paradigm (OLI) alone. 
4. KNOWLEDGE CREATION AND MANAGEMENT
The eclectic paradigm coupled with entrepreneurship theory 
would appear to “explain” instances of foreign direct investment. 
They do not, however, fully explain the strength and coherence 
of the multinational enterprise on an ongoing basis. One key to 
understanding the long-run sustainability of the MNE is how it 
creates, utilizes, protects, and transfers knowledge.
Early views of knowledge in the enterprise were very limited. During 
the height of managerial capitalism in the early- to mid-twentieth 
century, knowledge management advocates counseled recording 
and quantifying as much as possible. Beginning in the 1960s, 
attention was increasingly paid to the importance of R&D as a source 
of new opportunities, but this was seen as a largely distinct function 
(the R&D department).
Nonaka (1991) described knowledge creation as an ongoing process 
embedded throughout the enterprise. Subjective tacit knowledge 
held by individuals is externalized and shared. New knowledge, 
much of which may remain tacit, is socially created through the 
synthesis of different views. 
In Nonaka’s conception of the firm, knowledge keeps expanding 
through the socialization-externalization-combination-internalization 
(SECI) process. The process must be guided by the company’s 
vision for what it wants to become and the products it wants to 
produce. This vision of the future must go beyond goals defined KNOWlEdgE, ENTREpRENEURShIp, ANd CApABIlITIES: 
REVISINg ThE ThEORy Of ThE mNE
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by financial metrics alone. Good leaders can accelerate the SECI 
process and make it more productive by creating a corporate identity 
that employees find attractive.
In the SECI process, individual knowledge is shared within a team 
that has taken the time to build trust. Together, the team develops 
“new perspectives created from shared tacit knowledge” (Nonaka, 
1994: 25), which it then “crystallizes” into an output (e.g., a product 
concept). Upper management must then screen the output for 
consistency with corporate strategy and other standards.
Middle managers are the bridge that connects the visionary ideals of 
top management and the chaotic realities of front line workers.  Middle 
managers bear responsibility for solving the tensions between things 
as they are and the changes required for top management’s vision to 
be realized. The employees working on the middle manager’s team 
are the actual creators of new knowledge (Nonaka, 1994).
This model, which Nonaka (1988) calls “middle-up-down 
management”, puts middle managers in the most entrepreneurial 
role. The task of top management in this model is to challenge 
and inspire. It is then up to middle managers to lead teams whose 
members are drawn from different functional perspectives to 
engage in the give-and-take of knowledge creation, such as product 
development. The teams that they lead must be given autonomy to 
achieve their goals within the limitations of time-to-market and other 
requirements.
At the heart of the SECI process is the conversion of personal tacit 
knowledge to new, collectively constructed concepts. This is different 
from codification as conventionally understood, i.e., the simple 
documentation of personal knowledge.
Similarly, knowledge management must go beyond discrete facts that 
can be stored in databases or on intranets. Facts are information, but 
not necessarily knowledge.
Nonaka’s conception of knowledge is deeply rooted in individual 
experience. Shards of knowledge cannot be isolated in a database 
to be later recombined into something useful. Individual knowledge, 
in order to be useful to the enterprise, must be captured as part 
of building a collaborative commitment to a shared vision, with 
databases playing a supporting role. At Seven-Eleven Japan, for 
instance, front-line employees are trained to build hypotheses about 
what customers at their store want, and their hypotheses can be 
sharpened by consulting historical data from an extensive internal dAVId J. TEECE & ABdUlRAhmAN y. Al-AAlI
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system that contains not only point-of sale data and recommended 
product displays but also connects to company headquarters and to 
manufacturers (Nonaka and Toyama, 2007). The information in the 
database is a support for the knowledge of the employees.
5. DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES AND (SUSTAINABLE) MNE 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
The potential of the enterprise for knowledge creation and 
management takes us part way to understanding the MNE. The 
continued existence of the enterprise also requires commercial 
success. The dynamic capabilities framework in strategic 
management provides this final piece of the puzzle. Knowledge must 
be combined with good strategy and strong dynamic capabilities to 
capture value.
The concepts of organizational resources and capabilities (a type 
of resource) were developed in the strategic management literature 
during the 1980s. Dunning began the task of incorporating dynamic 
capabilities into the eclectic paradigm in some of the last work 
published before his untimely death (Dunning and Lundan, 2010).   
But his paradigm has little in the way of explanation for the origins 
of firm-level asset ownership and capability advantages, nor how to 
renew these advantages as the business environment evolves. The 
dynamic capabilities framework uses an integrative approach that 
encompasses entrepreneurship, ownership advantages, knowledge 
creation, and sustained advantage.
The foundations of dynamic capabilities can to some degree be 
traced back to Penrose (1959), who argued that a firm’s resources 
were applicable to more than one line of business and could be 
realigned to help the firm expand and diversify. Penrosean insights 
laid the foundation for the Resource-Based View of the firm, which 
focuses on possessing and utilizing fungible resources that meet the 
VRIN criteria (Valuable, Rare, Inimitable, and Non-substitutable) as 
the main mechanism for the generation of profits.  
However, the resources approach, like the eclectic paradigm, is weak in 
explaining how firms develop or acquire new capabilities and particularly 
how they adapt when circumstances change. The dynamic capabilities 
framework looks beyond the benefits of owning valuable resources 
and emphasizes a firm’s capacity to deploy its resources, adjust them 
as circumstances require, and generate or acquire new ones when 
needed.KNOWlEdgE, ENTREpRENEURShIp, ANd CApABIlITIES: 
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5.1. Ordinary capabilities 
It is perhaps easiest to understand what dynamic capabilities are by 
juxtaposing them against ordinary capabilities. Ordinary capabilities 
are used by an enterprise to produce and sell a defined (and static) set 
of products and/or services. They include operational competences 
and the planning and coordination processes for activities such as 
optimizing task performance, choosing a human resources approach, 
and selecting a composition for the board of directors.
Ordinary capabilities are unlikely to provide a basis for long-run 
competitive advantage outside of undeveloped and emerging 
economies. Knowledge about optimizing administrative and 
operational activities is largely explicit, and ordinary capabilities can 
generally be calibrated against the best practices of other firms. In a 
mature industry like autos, for example, productivity in areas such as 
procurement, manufacturing, and wholesale is similar across firms, 
at least in the developed countries (Lutz, 2011).
In certain locations, a firm may prosper for a while with strong ordinary 
capabilities but weak dynamic capabilities. In practice, environments 
with low competition, such as countries where tariff barriers keep 
out strong foreign competitors, are good candidates. The challenge 
comes when there is rapid change due to technological progress 
or other sources of hyper-competition (D’Aveni et al., 2010). By 
definition, weak dynamic capabilities mean that the firm is unable to 
adapt well to a new business environment.
MNEs are generally good at transferring their management practices 
to all countries where they operate (Bloom et al., 2012), and ordinary 
capabilities at home may for a while be distinctive abroad. The early 
overseas success of McDonald’s Corp. was in part due to its ability 
to transfer its considerable ordinary capabilities (Luo, 2000).
The rise and fall of Japan is perhaps in large part a capabilities story.   
Japanese firms rose to global dominance in many industries on 
the strength of their ordinary capabilities, developed by employing 
learning processes that resulted in operational excellence. They 
were generally able to transfer and adapt these capabilities for 
overseas production as needed. Over time, however, rivals of 
Japanese companies in autos, semiconductors, and other industries 
have not only learned to challenge Japanese quality and efficiency, 
they have also out-innovated Japan, particularly in the development 
of new products and business models. The large Japanese firms 
have proved unable to realign their activities in keeping with the dAVId J. TEECE & ABdUlRAhmAN y. Al-AAlI
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shifting business environment, that is, they have proved to have 
weak dynamic capabilities.
5.2. Dynamic capabilities  
Ordinary capabilities, as we have seen, are about doing things right.   
They involve efforts to optimize within certain fixed constraints. 
Dynamic capabilities, on the other hand, are about doing the 
“right” things. This requires assessing technological and business 
opportunities, forecasting the business environment, adjusting 
organizational design when necessary, and acting at the right time. 
The ability to deploy, or redeploy, resources in alignment with the 
necessary complementary assets is a key underpinning. The good 
judgment and deep wisdom of the top management team is another 
key to strong dynamic capabilities.
Dynamic capabilities are thus higher-order capabilities that help 
characterize how an organization develops strengths, extends them, 
synchronizes business models with the business environment, and/or 
shapes the business environment in its favor. They result from some 
combination of superior top management skills and organizational 
routines (Teece, 2007). The dynamic capabilities framework 
emphasizes the need for management to be able to continuously 
align people, processes, and assets to satisfy consumer desires and 
achieve strong financial performance. Strong dynamic capabilities 
in the service of good strategy can deliver long-term profitability and 
growth.
The dynamic capabilities perspective goes beyond a financial-
statement view of the firm’s assets to emphasize management’s 
abilities to orchestrate resources both inside and outside the firm at 
home and abroad. External linkages that must be leveraged to carry 
out a plan are increasingly common in the global economy, including 
suppliers, strategic alliances, university researchers, and business 
ecosystems. The MNE must identify, establish access or control, and 
then coordinate all the complementary assets that are needed to 
deliver the company’s products and services (Teece, 1986).
Unlike ordinary capabilities, dynamic capabilities are particularly 
difficult to transfer across borders because they are tacit and often 
embedded in a unique set of relationships and histories. Cultural 
differences will need to be accounted for since sensing new market 
opportunities requires capabilities in multiple geographies. This is 
not usefully thought of in transaction cost terms.KNOWlEdgE, ENTREpRENEURShIp, ANd CApABIlITIES: 
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For purposes of operationalizing the framework, dynamic 
capabilities can be disaggregated into three clusters of processes 
and managerial activities conducted inside firms: (1) identification 
and assessment of opportunities at home and abroad (sensing), 
(2) mobilization of resources globally to address opportunities and 
to capture value from doing so (seizing), and (3) continued renewal 
(transforming). Sensing is the most entrepreneurial of the three 
clusters, whereas seizing is dominated by more basic managerial 
concerns. Transforming places a premium on leadership. 
Sensing involves exploring technological possibilities, probing 
markets, listening to customers, and scanning the business 
environment. Entrepreneurial managers need to construct and test 
hypotheses about the market in order to identify unsatisfied demand. 
In the MNE context, it is critical that sensing activities are embedded 
throughout the company. Management must open channels that 
allow intelligence (not simply data) to flow from the farthest reaches 
of the organization toward the top management team to facilitate 
localization of the company’s products and services. Starbucks, for 
example, has adapted its presentation in China, where coffee is less 
popular than in Western countries, by creating attractive spaces 
where people can hold informal business meetings and enjoy non-
coffee beverages or China-specific sandwiches such as a “Hainan 
chicken and rice wrap” (Burkitt, 2012). Knowledge must also be able 
to flow laterally across subsidiaries.
Once opportunities are sensed, they can be seized. This requires the 
formulation of a strategy that sets a path forward. Strong dynamic 
capabilities enable the firm to flesh out the details around the new 
strategic intent and implement the strategic actions quickly and 
effectively by designing business models to satisfy customers, and 
securing access to the necessary capital and human resources. But 
strong dynamic capabilities can become worthless if they are tied to 
a poor or badly misjudged strategy. 
Transformation of the enterprise is called for when internal and 
external circumstances shift. Transformation capabilities include 
selectively phasing out old products, renovating older facilities both 
domestically and globally, and changing business models, methods, 
and even organizational culture. Transformational capabilities are 
needed most obviously when radical new threats and opportunities 
are to be addressed. But they are also needed periodically to soften 
the rigidities that develop over time from asset accumulation and the dAVId J. TEECE & ABdUlRAhmAN y. Al-AAlI
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development of standard operating procedures.
In fact, in established MNEs, sensing, seizing, and transforming are 
ongoing processes. The MNE may find itself emphasizing different 
clusters of capabilities in different geographic markets. For example, 
Yum Brands, the owner of fast-food brands KFC, Taco Bell, and 
Pizza Hut, has simultaneously engaged in rapid expansion (seizing) 
in China and in retrenchment and transformation in one of its 
established markets, the United Kingdom.
Transformation requires unusual leadership skills to help the 
organization deal effectively with path dependencies and other 
structural rigidities. Complementarities need to be managed to 
avoid creating major new problems when addressing old ones. 
Organizational rigidities make this process difficult; organizational 
transformations are accordingly risky. IBM is an example of a 
successful transformation, having changed from a hardware 
company into an “on-demand” services provider under outsider CEO 
Lou Gerstner from 1993 to 2002 (Harreld et al., 2007).
6. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MNE
A robust “theory” of the MNE that encompasses entrepreneurialism, 
knowledge management, and, especially, capabilities has numerous 
implications for the management of these firms. Some applications 
of the framework will be discussed here. These include the 
decisions about entry into new markets, knowledge transfer, and 
the relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries. Indeed, it is 
suggested that there is a far broader array of issues in international 
management that can be understood from a capabilities perspective 
than from a pure transaction cost economics approach to the MNE.
When an MNE senses a new opportunity in a foreign market, it 
must first assess its own capabilities. Does it already possess 
the necessary capabilities? Does it have experience transferring 
capabilities to other contexts? Does it have ready access to local 
knowledge in the host country? Can it achieve meaningful replication 
abroad of its capabilities at home?
When speed is of the essence and/or certain capabilities are absent, 
a joint venture or alliance with a host country partner is likely to be 
preferred, provided the MNE’s key advantages can be leveraged and 
protected within the relationship. When they are well managed, joint 
ventures and alliances can reduce financial outlays and improve the 
MNE’s access to specialized local capabilities.KNOWlEdgE, ENTREpRENEURShIp, ANd CApABIlITIES: 
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Strong dynamic capabilities are needed to transform the existing 
MNE resources into a suitable match with the host country 
environment and/or transform the host country market itself to build 
receptivity to the MNE’s product offering. Transformation also comes 
into play in the creation of internal structures that establish cross-
border control and two-way information flows. A plethora of cross-
boundary organizational processes will need to be employed. A 
transaction cost approach has little to say about these activities.
Once the entry decision is made, knowledge transfers will be 
required. The initial transfers may include routines associated 
with efficient manufacturing of the company’s products, personnel 
management, and other operational capabilities. 
Unless the MNE has already replicated its systems of productive 
knowledge in other markets, the act of replication for even ordinary 
capabilities is likely to be costly (Teece, 1976). New learning may 
be required because the skills and know-how that the MNE uses to 
undergird its ordinary capabilities in one geographic context might 
not quite fit in another.
Not only are some capabilities (and the routines upon which they 
rest) difficult to replicate, but even understanding which elements 
(routines, skills, know-how) are relevant to a particular capability may 
not be straightforward. Some sources of a firm’s advantage are so 
complex that the firm itself does not fully understand them (Lippman 
and Rumelt, 1982). 
Once entry and initial knowledge transfer have been effectuated, 
the MNE must design the relationship between headquarters and 
subsidiary. The knowledge-conscious MNE allows considerable 
autonomy to region/country managers, with incentives that support 
local discovery and local learning. Subsidiary managers should be 
encouraged to generate entrepreneurial insights and intangibles 
adapted to local conditions. These can potentially later be transferred 
to the parent or adapted directly by other business units (e.g., 
Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). 
Knowledge creation can even be encouraged among front-line 
employees. Swedish construction firm Skanska, for example, has a 
competitive grant program that encourages managers and workers 
to propose new apps for use on the tablet computers that have been 
issued to workers in the field. Winning proposals, such as an app for 
leak detection, are then commissioned to an external developer and 
deployed in the field (Schectman, 2012).dAVId J. TEECE & ABdUlRAhmAN y. Al-AAlI
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The MNE’s headquarters can enhance the firm’s capabilities by 
promoting organizational learning, managing complementarities, 
and supporting technology transfer across divisions. Headquarters 
provides a guiding vision and culture, performs global asset 
orchestration, and ensures the availability of financial resources. 
There is of course much more to managing the MNE. However 
most problems in international management will be illuminated by 
an awareness of the importance of entrepreneurial management, 
knowledge creation, and dynamic capabilities.
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